March
28, 2011
Last
February, Syria's deputy minister of telecommunications, Mohammed
Al-Jallali affirmed that the minimum reserve price for the upcoming auction for
Syria’s third mobile license would be set at $122 million (SYP5.6 billion). At
the end of 2010, five telecoms companies, Etisalat (U.A.E.), France Telecom,
Qtel (Qatar), Saudi Telecom Company and Turkcell (Turkey) pre-qualified for the
license auction. Still last February, Turkcell declared that it was not
interested anymore in bidding for the license. The reason for pulling out was
linked to restrictions of the Syrian markets.
At
this stage of the process it’s not clear which of the four remaining companies
will really fight hard to get the Syrian license in the next auction planned
for next April 12.
It’s
possible to assume that — given Etisalat’s failure to buy 46 percent of
Kuwait’s Zain for $12 billion (DH44.07 billion) — the Emirati company will now
probably focus its attention on the remaining regional but smaller
opportunities such as Syria’s third mobile license and Iraq’s fourth mobile
license. The adduced reasons for the failure were political unrest in Middle
East and disagreement among the different shareholders. “The successful
completion of the Zain deal would have given Etisalat control of a number of
market-leading mobile operations in the Middle East, and positioned them as the
leading pan-regional mobile operator in the region. Now, Etisalat’s
international investments team will most likely focus its efforts on the
remaining, smaller, opportunities in the region, such as Syria’s third mobile
license and Iraq’s fourth mobile license,” said Matthew Reed, senior
analyst with Informa Telecoms and Media, a research company. For Etisalat, the
pursuit of international revenues is a priority because its domestic market is
flat, if not declining, because of increased competition. Zain’s deal
would have been perfect for Etisalat because it would have given the Emirati
company direct access to several markets in the Middle Eastern region (Iraq,
Kuwait, Bahrain Jordan). Now, Etisalat has no other possibility than going
after regional telecom assets one by one. This new strategic posture could
still be implemented, but, with no doubt, it will be costlier and it will
require more time.
If
Qatar’s Qtel is still interested in some purchasing activity in Syria, some
doubts were emerging. “… [The] process is not completely clear to us. And it’s
quite hard to understand how much the license will cost. … Clearly we won’t do
it if we’re not happy with the financials and we’ve pulled out of license bids
before, principally in Egypt and Saudi because the economics were just wrong”
says Qtel’s chief strategist officer, Jeremy Sell. Finally, on March 27 during
the Annual General Meeting of Qatar Telecom, Qtel’s chairman, Sheikh Abdullah
bin Mohamed bin Saud al-Thani confirmed that “our board has taken the decision to pursue
the third license in Syria. We are going into Syria ... and we think it is an
important country to be in.” In particular, asked about the possible
difficulties of investing in Syria following the current political unrest,
Sheikh Abdullah stated that he is absolutely not concerned by recent events.
S.T.C.
Group’s most recent financial results showed an increasingly tough competition
in relations to the Saudi domestic market. In Q4 2010, S.T.C. posted a 23
percent decline in net profit to SAR2.29 billion ($610.7 million) while
S.T.C.’s operating profit increased 15 percent to SAR3.03 billion.
S.T.C.’s full-year net income declined in 2010 by 13 percent to SAR9.4
billion. These results were in line with analysts’ expectations. S.T.C. said
that in 2010 profits partially fell because of capital investments
domestically and abroad like in Bahrain and Kuwait. S.T.C. purchased Bahrain’s
third mobile license in March 2009 for around $240 million and launched its
operations in March 2010, while in Kuwait, S.T.C. owns 26 percent of the third
mobile operator Viva. “We already have a good traction on subscriber and
revenue growth. Kuwait and Bahrain are similar stories, with steady growth and
a good cost management approach, because they are both lean, small operations,”
says Ghassan Hasbani, S.T.C.’s C.E.O. for
international operations. It’s so quite possible that the third Syrian mobile
license — pertaining to an almost untapped market — will be an
attractive target for S.T.C., which is trying to implement an expansion on
a regional dimension in order to increase its net profits.
Last
month, rumors surfaced about France Telecom’s concerns on the price and
technical aspect of the license. In fact, some France Telecom executive told
Reuters that the French company had still to decide whether bidding for the
Syrian third license. “The process seems too fixated on the price of the
license, when we also have strengths to bring in terms of technology and
services” stated Elie Girard, France Telecom’s executive vice president of
group strategy and development. In specific, Girard pointed out that France
Telecom had concern in relations to the frequencies that would be offered
through the auction. In reality, the frequencies being sold with April’s
auction are in the lower band, while the current two mobile operators, Syriatel
and M.T.N. Syria, have frequencies in the higher band. The winning bidder could
be required to build a denser — and obviously more expensive — network in order
to well utilize the lower band frequencies.
April
12, 2011 is coming soon and the next two weeks will be a crucial moment in
order to understand which companies are really committed to entering the Syrian
mobile market. In the meanwhile, mobile users hope that the entrance of a third
operator could really increase competition so that prices may be lowered.
Facebook has already served as a tool for calling boycott
campaigns against Syriatel and M.T.N. Syria, both accused of maintaining
exorbitant rates for low-quality services in comparison to Syrian salaries (the
daily wage is around $8).
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